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Abstract 
This paper investigates the determinants of corporate risk taking. Shareholders with 
substantial equity ownership in a single company may advocate conservative investment 
policies due to greater exposure to firm risk. Using a large cross-country sample, I find a 
positive relationship between corporate risk taking and equity ownership of the largest 
shareholder. This result is entirely driven by investors holding the largest equity stakes in 
more than one company. Family shareholders avoid corporate risk taking as their 
ownership increases unlike mutual funds, banks, financial and industrial companies. 
Stronger legal protection of shareholder rights is associated with more risk taking, while 
stronger legal protection of creditor rights reduces risk taking. 
JEL classification: G34, G31 
Bank classification: Financial markets; International topics 
Résumé 
L’étude porte sur les déterminants de la prise de risques en entreprise. Les actionnaires 
qui ont des intérêts considérables dans une seule firme ont tendance à préconiser la 
prudence en matière de politiques d’investissement parce qu’ils sont davantage exposés 
aux risques. À partir d’un vaste échantillon multipays, l’auteure découvre qu’il existe une 
relation positive entre la prise de risques et la part des capitaux propres détenue par 
l’actionnaire principal. Ce résultat ne vaut que pour les investisseurs qui sont actionnaires 
principaux de plus d’une entreprise. À la différence des fonds communs de placement, 
des banques et des sociétés financières et industrielles, les actionnaires familiaux évitent 
la prise de risques à mesure que leur participation augmente. La prise de risques s’accroît 
lorsque les droits des actionnaires bénéficient d’une meilleure protection juridique que 
ceux des créanciers, et elle diminue dans le cas contraire. 
Classification JEL : G34, G31 
Classification de la Banque : Marchés financiers; Questions internationales 
 
 1 Introduction
Agency theory prescribes that ownership structure a®ects the ability of owners to in°u-
ence corporate risk taking (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Large shareholders enjoy cash
°ow and control bene¯ts from the companies they run.1 They have powerful incentives
to collect information and monitor managers in order to maximize their pro¯ts (Shleifer
and Vishny (1986), Grossman and Hart (1980), Amihud and Lev (1981)). As the own-
ership stake increases, ceteris paribus, shareholders have greater incentives to raise a
¯rm's pro¯t by taking risky projects. Concentrating much of their wealth in a single ¯rm
may force large shareholders to conduct business from a more risk averse position than
if they had a diversi¯ed portfolio of ¯rms. John et al. (2008) reason that since private
bene¯ts are important to large shareholders, they may take more conservative projects
to secure those bene¯ts. Hence, large shareholders have the incentive to take more risky
projects which, however, may be diluted due to the large exposure to a single company.
The net e®ect of ownership structure on risk taking is less clear and depends on the
optimal trade-o® between the costs and bene¯ts of large ownership stakes. In this paper,
I examine how these incentives a®ect risk taking behavior of shareholders.
At least several reasons motivate research on corporate risk taking by large share-
holders. Large shareholders are a prevalent class of investors wordldwide (Morck et al.
(1988)).2 Next, shareholders have signi¯cant impact on ¯rms' ¯nancial decisions by hold-
ing sizable stakes in companies. They can shape the nature of a ¯rm's corporate risk
taking, which may a®ect its ability to compete, and eventually its survival (Wright et al.
(1996)). An excessive appetite for risk can result in high-variance asset composition,
which may cause negative repercussions in the whole economy. Finally, the role of large
1Bene¯ts of control can be private and shared. Shared bene¯ts of control arise from the superior
management or monitoring that can result from the substantial collection of decision rights and wealth
e®ects that come with large-block ownership. Private bene¯ts of control that are derived from the
voting power to consume resources could either be pecuniary, such as excess salary for an individual
blockholder or synergies in production for a corporate blockholder, or they could be nonpecuniary, such
as the amenities that apparently come from controlling corporations like professional sports, teams and
newspapers. The concept of private bene¯ts of control has received lots of attention in the literature.
See Holderness (2003), Nenova (2003) and Dyck and Zingales (2004), among others.
2The majority of the US ¯rms have at least one blockholder (Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Mehran
(1995)). A recent study by Holderness (2009) reports that 96% of the ¯rms in the US have a blockholder.
2shareholders in corporate risk taking has received only limited attention in the empiri-
cal literature, unlike managerial ownership (Denis et al. (1997)), CEO pay-performance
sensitivity (Coles et al. (2006)) and legal protection of investors (John et al. (2008)).
What are the factors that a®ect risk taking of shareholders? In addition to ¯rm,
industry and country speci¯c characteristics, the size of the shareholder's stake plays
a role. Agency theory assumes that managers are risk-averse and shareholders are risk
neutral because they can diversify away idiosyncratic risks. Managers face an employment
risk that can be reduced by achieving earnings smoothing through diversi¯ed mergers
(Amihud and Lev (1981), May (1995)). According to these models, such risk reduction
tendency will be subdued in owner-controlled ¯rms in which shareholders have incentives
to take more risks. Thus, risk taking is expected to be more pronounced in ¯rms with
large shareholders than in ¯rms with dispersed ownership where risk-averse managers
are more in°uential. A similar prediction is generated by Laeven and Levine (2009)
who claim that diversi¯ed owners in banks will take more risks compared to relatively
undiversi¯ed debt holders and nonshareholder managers.
However, if large shareholders are not well diversi¯ed they may protect their cash
°ow and control bene¯ts by opting for conservative investment actions. The theoretical
keystone is that shareholders who are diversi¯ed in their cash °ow and control bene¯ts
will tend to advocate for more corporate risk taking than undiversi¯ed shareholders, the
assumption being that the utility of undiversi¯ed investors is lower than that of diversi¯ed
ones. While risks related to cash °ows from a single company can be diversi¯ed away, it
may be hard to alleviate excessive risk related to the bene¯ts of controlling blocks. They
are often characterized by privately negotiated trading of the whole block, the value
of which depends on the private bene¯ts of control (Dyck and Zingales (2004), Nenova
(2003)).
One way to improve this situation is to hold the largest controlling stakes in multiple
companies. In this paper, companies with the same largest shareholders are classi¯ed
as groups. Under these conditions, groups consist of legally independent ¯rms which
are bound together by the presence of the same largest shareholder. Groups can be
connected also through informal ties such as social ties, a common sense of identity,
3and trade relations (Khanna and Yafeh (2007)). Viewed as diversi¯ed entities, groups
provide a coinsurance e®ect by combining businesses whose cash °ows are less than
perfectly correlated and even more so if the stake of the largest shareholder is controlling.
According to Lewellen (1971) reduced variance in a ¯rm's cash °ows from diversi¯cation
serves to increase debt capacity, which may add value through taking more risky projects.
Groups provide economies of scope as well. For example, the controlling shareholder
may introduce the same marketing and distribution channel in ¯rms in which they have
controlling stakes. Similarly, a controlling shareholder may deal with the same suppliers,
lenders and customers. Group organizational structure allows large shareholders to act
from a more diversi¯ed position and thus take more risky projects. Under the assumption
that active monitoring is associated with risk taking, large shareholders in groups may
have an additional reason to take more risk due to the e±cient cost reduction by using
the same monitoring technology across ¯rms in the groups.3
Second, the type of the shareholders plays a role in risk taking. Families, for example,
may also avoid risk taking due to their goal of transferring the ¯rm to the next generation
(Anderson et al. (2003)). Risk taking may be a®ected by the regulatory constraints of
mutual funds and pension funds (e.g., Black (1990) and Roe (1990)). Brav and Thomas
(2008) compare ¯rms before and after an activist hedge fund accumulates a stake and ¯nd
signi¯cant changes in performance and ¯rm policies. Without examining the incentives
of each separate type of shareholder in detail, family owners are expected to be less risk
taking than mutual funds, ¯nancial companies, banks and industrial companies.4
Third, Jensen and Meckling (1976) recognize that the legal environment can mitigate
agency problems. Recent work by John et al. (2008) show that better investor protection
leads to riskier and value-enhancing investments. Strong legal protection is a mechanism
3One of the purposes of monitoring is to reduce the information asymmetry between managers and
owners (Holmstrom (1979)). Costly monitoring is associated with a greater precision in detecting the
most relevant information for constructing an optimal CEO contract. Monitoring reduces the informa-
tion asymmetry between managers and shareholders at the cost of a risk transfer from managers to
shareholders, presumably without compromising performance incentives. Thus, instead of compensating
the managers for risk taking, large shareholders take the risks themselves and receive compensation.
Active monitoring may be particularly pronounced in groups where the same monitoring technology can
be applied to a large number of ¯rms and thus achieve cost reduction.
4Kempf et al. (2009) ¯nd that risk taking behavior of mutual fund managers is a®ected by compen-
sation and employment incentives which depend on the mid-year performance of the funds.
4for curbing the private bene¯ts of large shareholders (La Porta et al. (2000)). Assuming
that private bene¯ts motivate conservative investments, the bene¯ts of control are ex-
pected to be lower in countries with strong legal protection, which may indirectly give
rise to risk taking. Thus, strong investor protection is expected to be positively related
to risk-taking.5 Acharya et al. (2008) propose that creditor rights protection a®ects risk
taking. Better protected creditors cause shareholders to incur higher bankruptcy costs,
which motivates the latter to avoid insolvency by engaging in conservative investment
policies.
Using a large cross-section of companies from 38 countries, the key ¯ndings are as
follows: First, corporate risk-taking and the percent of equity ownership are positively
correlated.6 Ownership concentration is the percentage of equity ownership of the largest
shareholder, and risk-taking is measured with the variation in country- and industry-
adjusted corporate earnings over total assets.
Second, to investigate the channel through which ownership a®ects risk taking, I
examine the role of groups. Half of the ¯rms are a±liated with a group, de¯ned as
a structure comprised of at least two companies having the same largest shareholder.
Conditional on a shareholder's participation in a group, I ¯rst ¯nd that risk-taking is lower
in group-a±liated companies; next, the relationship between risk-taking and ownership
is positive only for shareholders that participate in the group; for the rest, it is negative
and insigni¯cant depending on the speci¯cation.
Third, the type of the shareholder a®ects incentives for corporate risk taking . Families
do not take risky projects as their controlling stake increases. They also participate to
a much smaller degree in groups, which makes it impossible to evaluate the e®ect of
ownership on risk taking in family-controlled groups. The results suggest that they avoid
risk-taking outside groups. Large mutual funds and industrial ¯rms are taking more risks
once being in a group, unlike banks and ¯nancial companies.
Finally, I analyze the in°uence of regulation on corporate risk-taking. La Porta
5Deposit insurance, capital regulation and shareholders' protection are found to a®ect the ability of
bank owners to take risks (Laeven and Levine (2009), Gonzalez (2005)).
6As in Laeven and Levine (2009) this paper does not consider optimal risk taking, but rather it
provides empirical assessment of how group a±liation interacts with ownership in shaping risk taking.
5et al. (2000) posit that strong investor protection makes it more di±cult for controlling
shareholders to secure private bene¯ts through conservative corporate activity, which
forces them to pursue risky projects. Strong creditor rights protection, on the other
hand, may decrease risk taking because in these countries bankruptcy is more costly for
the shareholder. The results document that stronger shareholders' rights are associated
with more risk-taking, and stronger creditor rights with less risk-taking. The former
result is consistent with John et al. (2008), and the latter one with Acharya et al. (2008).
This paper is directly related to the strand of literature that examines the e®ect of
ownership on corporate risk-taking. Wright et al. (1996) hypothesize that institutional
owners exert a signi¯cant and positive in°uence on risk taking because of their incentive
to increase ¯rm value through the promotion of risk taking activities. Accounting simul-
taneously for the impact of insider and blockholders' ownership, the authors do not ¯nd
a signi¯cant relationship between the latter and risk taking. Gadhoum and Ayadi (2003)
test whether the ownership structure of Canadian ¯rms is negatively related to ¯rm risk.
The authors ¯nd a nonlinear relationship between ownership and risk; risk taking is high
at low and high levels of ownership. Laeven and Levine (2009) also document a positive
relationship between risk taking and ownership in banks. Unlike the above studies, I
emphasize the importance of group participation in risk-taking.
This paper also contributes to the literature on business groups. Khanna and Yafeh
(2007) point out in their survey paper that groups, as \a hybrid organizational form
between a ¯rm and a market may play an important role in our understanding of ¯rms."
I complement the results of Khanna and Yafeh (2005) by ¯nding that groups provide risk
sharing, which is re°ected in lower levels of risk taking in groups, all other things being
equal. I extend this result by uncovering that shareholders with large equity stakes are
taking more risks in groups as compared to outside groups.
The above results continue to hold after accounting for possible endogeneity of the
decision of the largest shareholders to invest in more than one ¯rm. Initially, I control
for the unobservable group ¯xed e®ects that might a®ect risk taking. Second, I apply
Heckman's correction method to control for self-selection bias induced by the decision of
¯rms to participate in a group. Third, I estimate a two-stage model. At the ¯rst stage,
6the residuals of time-varying corporate earnings are retrieved, and at the second stage the
standard deviations of the residuals are regressed on ownership and ¯rm-speci¯c controls.
The results are also robust to an application of the quantile estimation technique and a
number of additional robustness checks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I brie°y discuss
related literature and develop the hypotheses. Section 2 describes the data, variables
and descriptive statistics. Sections 3 and 4 present the estimates of risk-taking regres-
sions with and without group a±liation. Section 5 addresses endogeneity, and Section 6
provides robustness checks and Section 7 concludes.
2 Data, Sample, and Empirical Design
I examine the above questions using ¯rm-level ownership data from the OSIRIS database
provided by Bureau Van Dijk. The initial sources of information are from World'Vest
Base, Fitch, Thomson Financial, Reuters, and Moody's. The data contains the names
of shareholders, their type and the percentage of shareholdings reported once during the
period from 2003 to 2006 for listed ¯rms in 38 countries. The initial sample consists of
21,755 listed companies over the period 2003-2006 totaling 83,672 ¯rm-year observations.
To ensure consistency, only ¯rms with consolidated balance sheets are considered. After
excluding ¯rms from the ¯nancial sector (SIC 6000-6999) and ¯rms with total assets less
than $10 million, the sample consists of 13,486 ¯rms.7
2.1 De¯nition of Variables
The OSIRIS data reports the percentage of ownership for each shareholder only once for
the period from 2003 to 2006. Ownership is measured as the percentage of cash °ow
rights in the ¯rm. Depending on the speci¯cation, ownership of less than 10% is coded
at zero.
A business group in general is de¯ned as a set of legally separated ¯rms with a
7The sample in the regression analysis further drops due to availability of information on legal pro-
tection indexes.
7common shareholder.8 An important feature of the groups in this paper is that ¯rms
that belongs to the same group have the same largest shareholder (See Figure 1 for
graphical representation of groups). Thus, groups are comprised of the ¯rms in which
shareholders have the largest stakes. It is also possible that ¯rms are not only controlled
by the same largest owner but they also control subsidiaries (Figure 2).
A proxy for risk-taking is the volatility of corporate earnings. In particular, I consider
country- and industry-adjusted dispersion of ¯rm-level earnings over the sample period















Nc;k;t indexes ¯rms within country c, industry k and year t; EBITDA is earnings before
interest, taxes, and depreciation. For each ¯rm with available earnings and assets data, I
compute the deviation of a ¯rm's EBITDA/Assets from the country and industry average
for the corresponding year. Then, the standard deviation of this measure is used as a
proxy for risk.
Several variables are found to explain most of the cross-sectional variation of earnings
volatility at the ¯rm level. These variable are sales, corporate earnings (EBITDA=Assets)
and book leverage (the ratio is de¯ned as the ratio of long-term and short term debt to
assets) (John et al. (2008), Laeven and Levine (2009), Khanna and Yafeh (2005)). All
accounting data items are converted into $U.S. million. The variables are winsorized
at the 0.5% at each tail of the distribution. To characterize investor protection in each
country, the indexes of anti-director rights and credit rights protection retrieved from La
Porta et al. (1998) are employed.9
8See Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) and Khanna and Yafeh (2007) for discussion of various de¯nitions of
business groups in the literature.
9The anti-director rights index is \formed by adding one when: (1) the country allows shareholders
to mail their proxy vote to the ¯rm; (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to
82.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the distribution of the number of ¯rms across
countries.10 The number of ¯rms per country reported in column (1) varies signi¯cantly.
For example, the total number of ¯rms in Columbia is 9 and in Japan it is 2,296. The
total number of groups is 1,070 comprising of 6,936 ¯rms. The data shows that 52% of
all ¯rms are part of a group, i.e., the largest shareholder has the largest equity ownership
in more than one ¯rm in the sample. 12% of all groups are located in Japan, 10% in
Canada, 8.6% in the United Kingdom and 6.14% in Taiwan. Further investigation shows
that 44% of all ¯rms in the United Kingdom are in a group, similarly 90% in Japan, 56%
in Canada, 50% in the US and 20% in Taiwan.
The risk-taking measure, RISK, ranges from a low of 4.54% in Taiwan to a high of
13.83% in Australia. On average, the most levered ¯rms as measured by book leverage are
in Thailand, Chile and Portugal. Equity ownership of the largest shareholder also varies
substantially across countries. In Germany the average percent of shareholdings is 54.6,
while in Japan it is only 10.33. The correlation between the risk-taking variable (RISK)
and ownership is 0.02% and it is statistically signi¯cant (not tabulated). The correlations
between RISK and anti-director rights, and between RISK and creditor rights are 13%
and -10%, respectively.
Table 2 presents the results of mean and median comparisons for a number of char-
acteristics of group a±liated and non-a±liated ¯rms. The ¯rst two columns show means
and medians for all ¯rms. The average ownership stake of the largest shareholders is
25.82% while the median is 15.2%. A fraction of large ¯rms contribute to the discrep-
ancy between mean and median size as reported in million dollars of net sales. The
comparison of group a±liated and una±liated ¯rms shows that the average equity own-
the general shareholders' meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in
the board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the minimum
percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders' meeting
is less than or equal to 10%; (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can be waived only by
a shareholders' vote. The index ranges from zero to six. The creditor rights index is de¯ned as a
summation of four indexes de¯ned in La Porta et al. (1998). The index ranges from 0 to 4.
10The statistics do not include ¯rms in the ¯nancial sector and ¯rms with total assets smaller than
$10 million. Also, the sample is restricted by the availability of data on anti-director and creditor rights
indexes.
9ership stakes are 15.83% and 33.6%, respectively. Tests of the equality of mean and
median ownership stakes suggest that equity ownership is signi¯cantly higher in unaf-
¯liated ¯rms as compared to that in a±liated ones. Una±liated ¯rms are found to be
more risky than the a±liated ones. The size of a±liated ¯rms as measured by net sales is
signi¯cantly larger than that for una±liated ¯rms. In terms of pro¯tability, the t-test of
equally of means indicates that a±liated and una±liated ¯rms do not di®er, however the
sum-of-ranks test indicates that una±liated ¯rms are more pro¯table than the a±liated
ones. Note that this observation is in line with well documented evidence that diversi¯ed
(a±liated) ¯rms are less pro¯table and risky compared to stand-alone ¯rms (Berger and
Ofek (1995), Lang and Stulz (1994) and Laeven and Levine (2007)).
The risk-adjusted measure of EBITDA/Assets is calculated by dividing the average
pro¯tability measure EBITDA/Assets by the standard deviation of corporate earnings
(RISK). The risk-adjusted returns are lower for the una±liated ¯rms compared to the
a±liated ones. Also the una±liated ¯rms rely more on debt than the a±liated ones.
To describe groups, Table 3 shows statistics for various group-speci¯c characteristics
that capture di®erent aspects of group heterogeneity. Namely these measures are the
number of ¯rms in a group, the number of ultimate owners (UO) in a group ( de¯ned as
a controlling shareholder at the 10% level), the number of di®erent business segments as
measured by 2-digit SIC, and the number of di®erent countries in which ¯rms operate.
To measure the degree of ownership concentration in groups, I calculate a Hir¯ndahl
index for shareholder distribution de¯ned as: Dj =
P
w2
i, where wi is the weight of the
stock in the j ¡th group. High values of the index are associated with greater ownership
concentration. The average value of the index is 0.6. On average, a group is comprised
of almost 5.73 companies. Groups are operating in 3.9 distinct 2-digit SIC industries.
The average number of ¯rms operating in di®erent countries, a measure of international
diversi¯cation is 2, and the average number of ultimate owners, a measure of ownership
concentration in the group is 2.10.
The simple correlation matrix in Table 3 shows that risk is negatively related with
all diversi¯cation measures and positively related with ownership concentration captured
by the number of ultimate owners. The measures of diversi¯cation are highly correlated,
10however the correlation is far from perfect, suggesting that these proxies for group di-
versi¯cation are not redundant. The correlation between the average number of UO in
a group and all other diversi¯cation measures is weak suggesting that the two measures
capture di®erent aspects of diversi¯cation.
The dataset o®ers information on the type of the largest shareholders. Overall, the
bank largest shareholders comprise 11.03% of the sample (Table 4), families account for
a ¯fth of the sample and industrial companies for a third of it. Shareholders classi¯ed
as ¯nancial companies are less then 10%. Ownership patterns depend on the type of the
shareholders. 80% of the ¯rms with family largest shareholder have an ultimate owner,
though, only a small fraction of these shareholders participate in a group. Sharehold-
ers de¯ned as banks and mutual funds, on the other hand exhibit di®erent ownership
pattern|they have smaller shareholders and participate more frequently in groups.
2.3 Basic Regressions
Speci¯cation (1) allows us to test the e®ect of ownership on corporate earnings volatility.
RISKi = ®Ownershipi + ¯FirmControlsi + °InvestorProtectionc
+ ´CountryDummies + ±IndustryDummies + ²i; (1)
The dependent variable, RISK, is the standard deviation of country- and industry-
adjusted EBITDA/Assets of ¯rm i. Ownership is percentage of direct and indirect
equity ownership of the largest shareholder. If the largest owner has less than 10%
ownership, the value is coded at zero.11 FirmControls includes logarithm of sales, book
leverage (short and long term debt over assets) and corporate earnings (EBITDA/Assets)
speci¯ed at the beginning of the sample period that is year 2003;12 InvestorProtection
includes country level indexes such as anti-director rights and creditor rights as reported
in La Porta et al. (1998). To estimate the above equation, OLS method with clustered
11This modi¯cation is widely used in the literature (John et al. (2008), Faccio and Lang (2001)). In
the robustness section a threshold of 20% is used. The results still hold.
12As a robustness check I use the time average of each variable for each ¯rm.
11standard errors at the country level is applied. As shown in Table 1, the number of ¯rms
per country di®ers substantially. To avoid the possibility that this particular sampling
feature a®ects the results, each individual ¯rm observation is weighted with the inverse
of the number of country observations (sampled ¯rms) in a country.13
Risk and ownership might be jointly determined by common unobservable factors
which violates the consistency of the OLS estimator. As suggested by Demsetz and Lehn
(1985) ownership structure arises endogenously within the ¯rm. One way to address this
issue is to use an instrumental variable that is correlated with ownership structure and
uncorrelated with risk-taking. A potential candidate variable is the average ownership
of ¯rms in the same industry group and country.
To examine whether group a±liation a®ects risk-taking, I augment equation (1) with
a group dummy variable and an interaction term of ownership and the group dummy
variable:
RISKi = ®1Ownershipi + ½Group + »Ownershipi £ Group +
¯1FirmControlsi + °1InvestorProtectionc + ´1CountryDummies +
±1IndustryDummies + ²1i; (2)
Group takes the value one if a ¯rm belongs to a group, and zero otherwise. A positive
» is expected if a high level of stock ownership in a±liated ¯rms increases risk-taking
compared to a high level of ownership in una±liated ¯rms. This speci¯cation is similar to
Khanna and Yafeh (2005), however it di®ers by incorporating ownership. In additional
(unreported) speci¯cations, I include a set of group diversi¯cation measures to further
investigate the relation between diversi¯cation and risk-taking.
Group a±liated ¯rms may not comprise a random sample, which is con¯rmed by
observing substantial di®erences in ¯rm characteristics for these ¯rms a±liated to a
group and these that remain una±liated (Table 2). If a ¯rm's decision to diversify
a®ects corporate risk-taking, i.e., if Group and ²1i are correlated, the Group estimate
13See John et al. (2008) and Khanna and Yafeh (2005) for the use of similar approach.
12will be biased and inconsistent. To address this issue, I ¯rst estimate the Heckman
self-selection model that explicitly models the decision to diversify and incorporates its
e®ect into the risk-taking regression, which attenuates biases in the estimates ½ and
». Second, I estimate a two-stage model that ¯rst takes into consideration ¯rm-speci¯c
factors a®ecting average earnings and then evaluates the impact of ownership on the risk-
taking at the second stage. Third, group ¯xed e®ects are included, assuming that the
unobserved heterogeneity, leading to correlation between the error term and the Group
variable, is constant over time.
3 Risk-Taking: First Results
Speci¯cation (1), de¯ned in Section 3.3 is in line with Laeven and Levine (2009) that
examine 288 banks across 48 countries. By estimating similar regressions on a sample of
13,486 non-¯nancial ¯rms across 38 countries, I provide complimentary evidence of the
e®ect of ownership on risk-taking. This exercise sheds light on whether the relationship
between risk-taking and ownership is solely bank-speci¯c as suggested by Laeven and
Levine (2009), or of it is prevalent across industries. In e®ect, the agency argument that
risk-taking and ownership are related is not constrained only to banks. The extension of
Laeven and Levine (2009)'s analysis to non-¯nancial ¯rms demonstrates this point.
The main focus of the analysis is on the relationship between risk taking and owner-
ship. Using three di®erent measures of ownership, Table 5 columns (1)-(3), indicates that
ownership and risk-taking are positively correlated. In column (1) ownership is de¯ned
as an indicator variable taking the value of zero if ownership is smaller than 10% and
one if it is larger; in column (2) if the percent of ownership is less than 10% the variable
is coded at zero; in column (3) the percent ownership of the top ¯ve largest shareholders
is considered.
All speci¯cations include a set of control variables. The estimates on the initial values
of sales, earnings and leverage assume the expected signs. Larger ¯rms and ¯rms with
initially higher earnings are associated with lower operating risks. Previous literature
points out that earnings smoothing may lead to lower variability of corporate earnings.
13When including proxy for earnings smoothing as in John et al. (2008), its estimate is not
statistically signi¯cant, potentially due to the relatively short time period. This variable
is omitted from other regression speci¯cations. In an untabulated speci¯cation, I include
a quadratic term of equity ownership as suggested by Gadhoum and Ayadi (2003) and
Wright et al. (1996). While the coe±cient on this term is negative and signi¯cant in the
above mentioned studies, it is negative and insigni¯cant in the current speci¯cation for
which reason I omit the squared ownership from the speci¯cations.
To exclude the possibility that the relationship between ownership and risk-taking
might be driven by a parent-subsidiary tie, I exclude the fraction of shareholders who
own more than 50% of a ¯rm. The results shown in column (4), Table 5, are preserved.
The anti-director rights and creditor rights indexes are de¯ned in La Porta et al.
(1998). John et al. (2008) outline a number of arguments in support of either positive
or negative relationship between risk-taking and investor protection. Because investor
protection and ownership concentration are substitutes, in countries with strong investor
protection corporations with risk-averse dominant shareholders are expected to be less
prevalent. This explains the negative relation between risk-taking and investor protec-
tion. La Porta et al. (2000) provide di®erent argument of why risk-taking might be lower
in countries with strong shareholder rights. To secure their private bene¯ts, large share-
holders abstain from taking risky projects. In countries with strong investor protection,
it might be more costly to secure these bene¯ts through passive corporate policies. This
will force shareholderholder to switch from conservative risk-taking that secures private
bene¯ts to more aggressive risk-taking.
In column (1), the coe±cient on the anti-director rights index takes a positive sign.
John et al. (2008) include a richer set of investor protection indexes such as rule of law
and accounting disclosure standards. They also ¯nd a positive, but not always signi¯cant
relationship between anti-director rights and corporate risk-taking. One explanation of
the lack of a signi¯cant link between external ownership and regulation is a substitution
e®ect between the actual availability of large shareholders and strong investor protection
(La Porta et al. (1999), Burkart et al. (2003)).
Another proxy for investor protection is the index of creditor rights. Acharya et al.
14(2008) propose that countries with stronger creditor rights make ¯rms engage in risk-
reduction activities, the argument being that strong creditor rights incur higher liquida-
tion costs for investors. Consistent with this argument, I ¯nd that the coe±cient on the
creditor rights index is negative and signi¯cant in all speci¯cations in Table 5.
Table 6 presents results for the sample of ¯rms having a controlling shareholder (ul-
timate owner) de¯ned as a shareholder with more than 10% ownership. The rational for
splitting the initial sample is to unveil any potential correlation between large ownership
and ¯rm characteristics that might a®ect the estimate on ownership. The estimate on
ownership in column (1) clearly indicates that the entire e®ect of ownership on risk-taking
is coming from the sample of ¯rms with controlling shareholders that comprises 64% of
the entire sample.
Columns (2) to (6) present the results from regressions of risk-taking on ownership
of di®erent types of shareholders. As reported in column (2) family owners are found
to take less risky projects as their ownership increases. They may have incentives to
avoid risks in order to secure a ¯rm's long-term survival (Anderson et al. (2003)). On
the other hand, shareholders such as mutual funds and ¯nancial companies that target
high returns and maintain well-diversi¯ed portfolios are expected to take more risks.
The results in columns (4) and (5) show that the relationship between ownership and
risk-taking is positive for these types of owners. This is not the case for bank large
shareholders, shown in column (6). A closer investigation of bank controlling owners
suggest that a third of them have stocks in US ¯rms and they exhibit somewhat similar
positive relationship between ownership and risk taking. It is possible that bank equity
ownership is a subject of speci¯c regulation which requires an additional investigation
beyond the scope of this paper.
Overall, this analysis suggests that large shareholders are taking greater risks as mea-
sured by the standard deviation of ¯rms country- and industry-adjusted corporate earn-
ings. To a certain extent, this relationship depends on the type of the largest shareholder:
families do not take risks as their ownership increases. The results con¯rm previous re-
sults of the e®ect of ownership on risk taking (Laeven and Levine (2009)) and the e®ect
of legal protection on risk-taking (John et al. (2008), and Acharya et al. (2008)). These
15studies do not ask whether large shareholders preserve their risk-taking tolerance had
they hold a portfolio of the largest ownership stakes. The next section addresses the
issue of holding equity stakes in more than one company.
4 Results: Group A±liation and Risk-Taking
Table 7 reports the results of regression speci¯cation (2) de¯ned in Section 3.3.14 The
model in column (1) is similar to those estimated in Section 3, however, it accounts for the
presence of group e®ect by including a group dummy and the interaction term between
the group dummy and the ownership stake of the largest shareholder. The dummy
variable, Group, equals one if a ¯rm belongs to a business group and zero otherwise.
The estimates show that the coe±cient on the group dummy is negative and signi¯cant.
Firms a±liated with a group exhibit 0.85% lower standard deviation of earnings than
una±liated ¯rms. This result is similar to Khanna and Yafeh (2005) who examine twelve
emerging markets and interpret the negative e®ect of group on risk-taking as a form
of risk-sharing. The estimates of ownership and the interaction term between group
a±liation and ownership are of particular interest. The positive sign of the interaction
term suggests that owners with large stakes tend to advocate risk-taking only if they are
in a group. One explanation of the positive marginal e®ect of ownership on risk-taking
conditional on group participation is that shareholders achieve better diversi¯cation in
groups. Because diversi¯ed owners derive greater utility of risk-taking, they are expected
to be more prone to taking projects with more volatile earnings.
The coe±cients on IntialSales, InitialBookLeverage and InitialEBITDA take the
expected signs. As in John et al. (2008) the coe±cient on ¯rm size measured by log sales
is negative and signi¯cant, indicating that large ¯rms exhibit lower risk-taking. Similarly,
initially more pro¯table ¯rms are associated with lower risk-taking.
I estimate the speci¯cation in column (1) separately for group a±liated and stand-
alone ¯rms. The estimation with the partitioned sample removes biases that arise from
correlation between the group dummy and other controls. The estimates of ownership
14All standard errors of the estimates are clustered at the country level. Clustering at the group level
does not a®ect the signi¯cance of the estimates.
16clearly con¯rm that the positive link between ownership and risk-taking is pertinent to the
group-a±liated ¯rms (column 2). On the contrary, ownership stakes and risk-taking are
negatively correlated for stand-alone ¯rms (column 3). One standard deviation increase
in ownership increases the group-a±liated ¯rms' volatility , on average, by 12 basis points
of its mean; while outside groups the volatility decreases by 15 basis points of its mean.
Column (4) presents the results for controlling shareholders de¯ned at the 10% of
ownership that comprise 70% of the full sample. The e®ect of ownership on risk-taking
conditional on shareholder being in a group is valid only for controlling shareholders.
Taking together the results from column (2) in Table 5 and from column (4) in Table 7,
large owners seem to take higher risks if they are in groups and low risks outside group.15
In Table 7 column (5), I summarize the estimated coe±cients from a speci¯cation us-
ing Hirfendahl index to account for the degree of ownership concentration in groups. The
index is multiplied by -1, which means that high values of the index indicate signi¯cant
degree of diversi¯cation. Firms that are not group a±liated have index that equals -1.
The estimate on ownership for a ¯rm with median Hirfendahl index is 0.03 percentage
points [0.016+1/2*0.026], while the estimate for a ¯rm that is not diversi¯ed at all is
0.016 which con¯rms that greater ownership diversi¯cation is associated with more risk
taking.
The presented results thus far, except for the speci¯cation in column (5), imply that
all groups a®ect ¯rms' risk-taking in the same way. Accounting for group characteristics
might a®ect the results presented in Table 7. I estimate speci¯cations (untabulated) with
three di®erent proxies for diversi¯cation: (i) corporate diversi¯cation is the number of
di®erent industry groups (two-digit SIC industries) in which ¯rms in the group operate;16
(ii) the second measure captures geographical diversi¯cation by counting the number of
di®erent counties in which ¯rms in the group operate; (iii) the third measure captures
the degree of ownership concentration of the group and it is measured by the number of
¯rms in which the largest shareholder owns more than 10% equity. For all speci¯cations
15As a robustness check, I exclude groups comprised of very large number of companies. The results
are preserved.
16This measure is widely employed in the literature. See Martin and Sayrak (2003), Khanna and Yafeh
(2005), Aggarwal and Samwick (2003), Denis et al. (2002) among others.
17the coe±cient on the group a±liation remains negative and statistically signi¯cant, and
the coe±cient on the interaction term with ownership is positive and signi¯cant. The
proxies for diversi¯cation do not a®ect risk-taking signi¯cantly, even though all estimates
take the expected signs.
Table 8 presents the results from similar speci¯cations for di®erent types of share-
holders. Several interesting patterns emerge from these results. Mutual funds that are
a±liated to a group do not advocate for risk taking. However, when considering only
940 mutual funds with stakes higher than 10%, the results indicate that these investors
take risks. Controlling ownership by banks and ¯nancial companies does not in°uence
a ¯rm's risk taking decision either inside or outside groups. Family owners, remaining
in most of the cases outside groups, promote less risk-taking as their ownership stake
increases. Finally, shareholders classi¯ed as industrial companies take more risk once in
a group, however they avoid this behavior outside groups.
5 Endogeneity Issues
The estimated models raise some econometric concerns. As pointed out by Campa and
Kedia (2002), Graham et al. (2002), Laeven and Levine (2007), and others, ¯rm-speci¯c
factors that drive the decision to be in a group might a®ect risk-taking. Thus, to evaluate
the e®ect of group diversi¯cation on risk-taking per se one has to control for the underly-
ing factors that drive the group decision. Thus, group a±liation should be treated as an
endogeneous outcome that optimizes risk-taking, given a set of exogeneous determinants
of diversi¯cation. Evaluating the impact of group a±liation on risk-taking therefore re-
quires taking into account the endogeneity of the decision to hold shares in more than
one company.
To account for the possibility that ownership and risk taking are endogeneous due to
unmodelled heterogeneity for example, Table 9 column (1) shows results of instrumental
variable estimation. As in Laeven and Levine (2009), ¯rm ownership is instrumented
with the average ownership of all other ¯rms operating in the same 2-digit SIC and
the same country. It is not expected that the change in risk in one ¯rm will a®ect
18the average ownership of the whole industry. The results show that the instrument
enters signi¯cantly the ¯rst stage. The Hausman test of endogeneity con¯rms that the
IV estimate of ownership is larger than the OLS estimate, which suggests that OLS
understates the \true" e®ect of ownership on risk-taking.
To control for the endogeneity of the group a±liation decision, I take three steps.
First, I include a set of group ¯xed e®ects. The main idea behind this approach is to
control for unobserved and unchanging characteristics that are related to both the ¯rm
controls and the risk-taking variable. Since, the size of groups varies substantially, from 2
¯rms in a group up to 300 ¯rms, in order to account for the group ¯xed e®ect, I focus only
on a subset of groups that have more than 15 ¯rms in a group (at the 90th percentile).
In column (2) and (3) the OLS and group ¯xed e®ects are displayed. The signs of the
coe±cients on all variables remain similar to the OLS estimates presented in Table 7
column (1). The standard errors of the estimate on ownership increase under the ¯xed
e®ect as compared for the OLS estimates, however, it remains statistically signi¯cant.
The smaller magnitude of the estimate suggests that group ¯xed e®ects and ownership
are correlated to some extent; however, the ownership stake of the largest shareholders
a®ects risk-taking independently from unobserved group heterogeneity.
Second, I estimate an endogeneous self-selection model using Heckman (1979) two-
step selection procedure. In the ¯rst step, I estimate a probit model of whether a ¯rm
belongs to a group. The control variables in this speci¯cation are the fraction of groups
in an industry, industry size, industry and country dummies.17 The fraction of groups
in an industry is expected to a®ect group a±liation choice, but not a ¯rm's earnings
volatility. In the second stage, risk-taking is the dependent variable and the controls
are ¯rm characteristics and the predicted probability of group participation. The esti-
mates are presented in column (4) in Table 9. The coe±cient on ownership is positive
and signi¯cant, and it is consistent with that found in the previous speci¯cations. The
self-selection parameter, lambda is negative and signi¯cant, which suggests that factors
a®ecting the decision to be in a group are negatively correlated with risk-taking.
17Campa and Kedia (2002) use the fraction of all conglomerate ¯rms in an industry as a proxy for
industry attractiveness to account for diversi¯cation decisions and its impact on excess value. For a
similar approach, see Laeven and Levine (2007).
19The ¯nal test of endogeneity of group a±liation follows Khanna and Yafeh (2005).
For example, it might be the case that ¯rms with high pro¯ts systematically share risks
with ¯rms with low pro¯ts in the group, which will result in stable performance within
groups. To account for this type of endogeneity, a two-stage estimation is considered.
At the ¯rst stage, I allow pro¯tability to be determined by ¯rm characteristics and
¯rm ¯xed e®ects. The second stage employs the standard deviation of the residuals
from the ¯rst stage as a dependent variable. In such a way only the \unexplained"
variation in pro¯tability is explored. In addition to the controls from the ¯rst stage, the
group dummy and its interaction with ownership are included. This approach, labeled
by Khanna and Yafeh (2005) the conditional variance of pro¯tability, is quite intuitive.
Unexplained changes in pro¯tability are expected to be smaller for group-a±liated ¯rms.
The results are presented in column (5) in Table 9. Although the estimate on the group
dummy decreases in magnitude, it preserves the same negative and signi¯cant sign. The
interaction term between group and ownership is still positive and signi¯cant which does
not question the conclusion that the percent of ownership of the largest shareholder in
group-a±liated ¯rms is positively linked to corporate risk-taking.
In sum, whether using ¯xed e®ects, two-stage estimation method, or self-selection
model, equity ownership by the largest shareholder is found to be positively related to
¯rm risk-taking.
6 Robustness Checks
6.1 Groups and Subsidiaries
Groups so far are de¯ned as horizontally-linked entities, however, they may be vertically-
linked as depicted in Figure 2. In such a complex ownership structure where the ultimate
owner controls subsidiaries via a chain of ¯rms, there is a divergence between control and
cash °ow rights. One consequence of having high control and low cash °ow rights in many
¯rms is that the controlling shareholder may have incentives to bene¯t by tunneling cash
°ow from ¯rms where they have low cash °ow rights (at the bottom) to ¯rms where they
have high cash °ow right at the top (Johnson et al. (2000)). John et al. (2008) reason that
20such tunneling may increase variability in earnings due to reshu²ing of resources from
low to high cash °ow units. Also, large shareholders may be more risk taking because
they face a weaker constraint of ¯nancial distress in ¯rms where they have low cash °ow
rights and high voting rights (Morck et al. (2005)).
To the extent that groups are also pyramidal in structure, it may be di±cult to isolate
the tunneling story from the group-driven diversi¯cation. Consistent with the argument
of Khanna and Yafeh (2007) that \groups are not always pyramids, nor are all pyramids
groups," I document that only 14% of all group a±liated ¯rms have subsidiaries. Table
10 reports results from speci¯cations that account for the presence of subsidiaries. The
coe±cient estimate on the subsidiary dummy variable in column (1) suggest that on
average ¯rms with subsidiaries (regardless of groups a±liation) are risk taking, though
the estimate is not statistically signi¯cant. Ownership is positively linked to risk taking,
however, less so in ¯rms with subsidiaries. Thus far the results suggest that groups
with subsidiaries exhibit completely opposite risk taking behavior than groups without
subsidiaries. In columns (4) and (5), risk taking of groups with and without subsidiaries
is examined. It is evident that ownership is positively linked with risk taking only in
groups that do not have subsidiaries, while in groups with subsidiaries risk avoidance
is observed. Only 728 ¯rms are both group-a±liated and have at least one subsidiary,
which may be the reason for the noisy statistically insigni¯cant estimate on ownership.
Interestingly, ownership is negatively linked to risk taking both in una±liated ¯rms with
and without subsidiaries (columns 5 and 6). Using the set of ¯rms that are group-a±liated
but do not have subsidiaries as a control group to the set of ¯rms that are group a±liated
but have subsidiaries to estimate the role of subsidiaries in groups con¯rms the positive
relationship between ownership and risk taking in groups. Although the choice of large
shareholders to control ¯rms with subsidiaries may arise endogenously within ¯rms, the
results allow to rule out the tunneling story in explaining risk taking in groups.
6.2 Risk-Taking by the Largest Shareholders in the USA
In this section, I examine US ¯rms that comprise a half of the total sample. One advan-
tage of examining a single country as opposed to many countries is that one can avoid the
21impact of uncontrolled cross-country heterogeneity that may otherwise bias the results.
Due to data availability for the US, this section o®ers an alternative measure of risk that
is the variability in monthly stock returns from CRSP over the period 2003-2006. This
measure, based on monthly stock returns is less noisy. Risk here is de¯ned as the stan-
dard deviation of monthly stock returns adjusted for industry returns. Columns (1) and
(2) in Table 11 show OLS and IV results similar to column (1) in Table 5 and column
(1) in Table 9. The OLS and IV estimates are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to
those from the full sample (Tables 5 and 9) which gives reassurance that the de¯nition
of risk does not alter the conclusions.
Group a±liated ¯rms, which comprise 45% of the ¯rms in the US, exhibit higher risk-
taking conditional on an increase in equity ownership. In particular, owners de¯ned as
mutual funds and banks that are part of a group also exhibit risk-taking behaviour with
an increase in their equity stakes. The results from the last column in Table 11 ¯nally
con¯rm that outside of groups, the percentage of ownership does not a®ect corporate
risk-taking of the US ¯rms. This evidence is closely related to the results for the whole
sample which alleviates concerns that the results are valid for only a small subsample of
¯rms.
6.3 Quantile Regressions
The results might be driven by outliers in the distribution of corporate earnings. To
address this possibility, I estimate a series of quantile regressions. The advantage of
quantile over ordinary least squares regressions is that the former permit the estimation
of the marginal e®ect of a covariate on risk-taking at various points of the distribution.18
Speci¯cally, I run the following regression:




µ¹(RISKi ¡ ¯Ownershipi ¡ ÃControlsi)
18For detailed introduction of quantile regressions, see Koenker and Hallock (2001), and Buchinsky
(1998).
22where the coe±cient ¯(¹) captures the quantile e®ect of ownership on risk-taking, µ¹(u) =
u(¹¡I(u < 0) and I(:) is an indicator function, Controlsi includes the same set of vari-
ables speci¯ed in equation (1). The estimation is conducted for ¹ = 0:25;0:50;0:75;0:90.
Table 12 presents a series of quantile regressions of risk-taking on the set of controls as
speci¯ed in equation (1). The results in columns (1) to (4) refer to the group-a±liated
¯rms, and in columns (5) to (8) refer to the una±liated ¯rms. For the a±liated ¯rms,
ownership a®ects the whole distribution of the risk-taking measure (standard deviation
of corporate earnings over assets), however ownership in°uences only a little the top
and the bottom of the distribution. Columns (5)-(8) show that ownership does a®ect
risk-taking negatively, however, this result is (statistically) preserved only for the ¯rms
located at the bottom of the distribution earnings' volatility of una±liated ¯rms.
6.4 Miscellaneous
Pooling a large set of countries, might mask heterogeneity across countries. In columns
(1) to (2) of Table 13, I exclude sequentially Japan and Canada as countries with high
percentage of group-a±liated ¯rms. After excluding each country separately from the
sample, the estimated coe±cients do not di®er from the results of the full sample. In
column (3), I exclude the largest industry, manufacturing. In column (4), I exclude share-
holders classi¯ed as mutual funds and banks. The speci¯cation in column (5) includes
all ¯rms and the ownership variable is coded at the 20% as opposed to 10%. The results
are preserved. The last column (6) omits the country speci¯c anti-director and creditor
rights indexes which are not available for all countries in the sample. The increased
sample size does not a®ect the main estimates of ownership and group a±liation.
7 Conclusion
This study examines the relationship between ownership and corporate risk-taking. Us-
ing data from a large cross-country sample, I ¯nd that ownership and risk-taking are
positively related. This result is preserved only for owners having equity ownership in
more than one company. Being in a group allows shareholders to act from a more di-
23versi¯ed position which explains the higher risk taking. The results continue to hold
after controlling for the endogeneity of group a±liation in several di®erent ways. Legal
protection also plays a role in risk-taking. Countries with better protection of share-
holder rights seem to be associated with more risk-taking, while in countries with strong
protection of creditor rights corporate risk-taking is restrained.
This paper contributes to the literature on corporate risk taking by analyzing owner-
ship of the largest shareholder in non-¯nancial companies and the literature on corporate
diversi¯cation. The results lend support to the view that equity ownership plays a role
in risk-taking if owners hold the controlling stakes in multiple companies. Having di®er-
ent risk-taking incentives, the type of shareholders also a®ects the relationship between
ownership and risk taking. Family controlling owners are avoiding corporate risk as their
equity ownership increases. Consistent with theory, I argue that ignoring group partici-
pation may lead to incomplete conclusions about the impact of ownership on corporate
risk taking.
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28Table 1: Summary Statistics by Country
The table shows the distribution of ¯rms across countries and summary statistics of selected variables
from OSIRIS data over the period 2003-2006. RISK is the standard deviation of country- and industry-
adjusted EBITDA/Assets. Book leverage is de¯ned as short term debt plus long term debt over assets.
EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. Ownership is the percentage
of equity stake of the largest shareholder in the ¯rm.
Country Number Number RISK Book Sales EBITDA/ Own.
Firms Firms in Groups Leverage Assets %
Argentina 42 13 6.83 32.91 646 14.44 40.14
Australia 633 235 13.83 24.30 499 8.37 27.72
Austria 49 8 5.45 26.65 859 9.74 53.58
Belgium 90 11 5.96 26.51 1377 11.81 46.57
Brazil 147 50 7.42 34.00 1398 14.35 45.14
Canada 744 416 10.23 23.59 960 4.61 27.60
Chile 118 48 4.13 35.06 711 11.54 51.10
Colombia 9 3 6.88 26.15 587 8.58 46.27
Denmark 98 21 7.59 25.92 922 9.57 34.98
Egypt 92 65 5.98 29.07 195 13.94 52.49
Finland 111 22 7.03 24.81 1429 11.57 30.36
France 440 50 6.12 23.75 1454 9.61 50.29
Germany 400 64 7.18 23.32 1814 9.49 54.60
Greece 138 17 4.69 33.87 552 9.76 37.20
Hong Kong 110 39 5.87 21.88 1051 9.72 36.86
India 186 143 7.39 30.34 409 14.85 29.04
Indonesia 416 67 5.72 38.12 219 10.24 35.13
Ireland 50 23 7.13 28.42 1133 6.14 27.47
Israel 105 47 7.80 20.12 431 4.55 24.35
Italy 203 34 5.18 27.73 1468 8.78 39.27
Japan 2,296 2,063 3.66 22.31 1576 8.75 10.33
Malaysia 695 211 6.10 26.91 149 8.26 19.63
Mexico 82 41 4.87 24.82 2480 13.76 23.82
Netherlands 130 42 7.89 33.54 2733 11.40 33.92
New Zealand 77 27 7.21 24.07 291 15.06 29.10
Norway 151 37 7.27 29.63 860 9.73 35.61
Pakistan 30 17 6.76 26.56 508 22.39 45.09
Peru 17 4 9.05 25.78 351 18.04 47.41
Portugal 44 8 5.83 40.70 1540 9.39 37.30
Singapore 459 105 7.63 23.87 256 9.45 31.18
South Africa 139 46 10.46 16.99 885 18.79 39.59
Spain 101 23 7.65 28.06 2571 15.93 30.87
Sweden 232 92 8.12 19.07 1298 7.40 32.93
Taiwan 958 192 4.54 29.56 423 10.45 15.41
Thailand 256 126 6.08 34.01 340 12.23 21.65
Turkey 59 44 6.32 17.85 1374 15.07 27.01
United Kingdom 1,110 487 8.38 22.72 1166 7.49 25.58




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































31Table 4: Distribution of Firms by Type of the Largest Shareholders
Ultimate owner (UO) is de¯ned as a shareholder with equity ownership at least 10%. Ownership is the
percent equity ownership of the largest shareholder. RISK is the standard deviation of country- and
industry adjusted-corporate earnings.
Type % Firms % Firms % Firms Ownership RISK
with UO in Groups
Bank 11.03 29.36 90.89 9.47 6.4
Family 22.01 80 8.81 26.89 11
Financial Company 8.66 55 55.41 19.07 8.42
Industrial Company 33.35 82 26.35 41.05 9.47
Mutual Fund 21.2 52 68.2 14.87 10.2
Table 5: Risk-Taking Regressions: Basic Speci¯cation
This table reports the estimates from OLS ¯rm-level regressions of corporate risk-taking (RISK). Group
dummy equals one for ¯rms a±liated with a group. OwnershipDummy is an indicator variable taking
the value of 1 for ownership greater than 10%. Top-¯ve Ownership is the summation of the ownership
stakes of the top-¯ve shareholders. Ownership is the percentage of equity stake of the largest shareholder
in the ¯rm, coded at zero if it is smaller than 10%. EBITDA/Assets is earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. Sales is the logarithm of net sales. Book leverage
is de¯ned as short term debt plus long term debt over assets. All controls are retrieved for the year of
entry in the sample. ADR is anti-director rights index and CR is the creditor rights index. Column
(4) includes only ¯rms with largest shareholder having less than 50%. Clustered standard errors are
reported in brackets. Each ¯rm observation is weighted with the inverse of the number of ¯rms from its
domicile country. *** denotes 1% signi¯cant level, ** denotes 5% signi¯cant level, and * denotes 10%
signi¯cant level.







ADR 0.585*** 0.586*** 0.571*** 0.744***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.015] [0.023]
CR -1.585*** -1.574*** -1.560*** -1.817***
[0.062] [0.058] [0.058] [0.080]
Initial Sales -0.656*** -0.656*** -0.657*** -0.632***
[0.025] [0.025] [0.022] [0.018]
Initial EBITDA/Assets -0.181*** -0.181*** -0.181*** -0.181***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
Initial Book Leverage 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Firms 11678 11678 11678 9581























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































35Table 9: Additional Estimation Procedures
This table reports the estimates from ¯rm-level regressions of corporate risk-taking (RISK). Group is
an indicator variable that equals one for ¯rms a±liated with a group and zero otherwise. Ownership is
the percentage of equity stake of the largest shareholder in the ¯rm, coded at zero if it is smaller than
10%. All controls are retrieved for the year of entry in the sample. EBITDA/Assets is earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. Sales is the logarithm of net sales.
Book leverage is de¯ned as short term debt plus long term debt over assets. ADR is anti-director rights
index and CR is the creditor rights index. Column (1) presents estimates form instrumental variable
regressions. Column (2) shows ¯xed e®ect estimates at the group level for groups consisted of a large
number of ¯rms. Column (3) covers the same sample as in column (2) however it does not account for
group ¯xed e®ects. Clustered standard errors are reported in brackets. Each ¯rm observation is weighted
with the inverse of the number of ¯rms from its domicile country. Country and industry (one-digit SIC
code) dummies are not reported. *** denotes 1% signi¯cant level, ** denotes 5% signi¯cant level, and
* denotes 10% signi¯cant level.
IV Fixed E®ects OLS Self-Selection Two-Stages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Group -0.295*
[0.147]
Ownership 0.120*** 0.031** 0.074*** 0.009** -0.005
[0.046] [0.015] [0.018] [0.004] [0.004]
Ownership£Group 0.010*
[0.005]
Initial Sales 0.647** -0.738*** -0.657*** -0.843*** -0.489***
[0.278] [0.063] [0.107] [0.091] [0.073]
Initial EBITDA/Assets -1.213** -0.092*** -0.079*** -0.138*** -0.001
[0.570] [0.008] [0.019] [0.007] [0.003]
Initial Book Leverage -0.582*** 0.003 0.004 0.012** -0.084***
[0.072] [0.005] [0.007] [0.005] [0.010]
ADR -0.191*** 0.299 0.842*** 0.155 1.049***
[0.012] [0.194] [0.223] [0.650] [0.062]
CR -0.005 -0.617*** -0.939*** -1.293 -0.576***
[0.006] [0.154] [0.176] [1.073] [0.061]
Lambda -3.46
[1.07]
Firms 11910 2885 2885 11980 11153


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)) R R R R R R R R R R R R R
Firm1 Firm2 Firm3
Figure 1: Group. ®, ¯ and ° are the largest equity















Figure 2: Group with Subsidiaries. ®, ¯ and °
are the largest equity stakes in Firm1, Firm2 and
Firm3. Sub1, Sub2 and Sub3 indicate subsidiaries of
Firm1, Firm2 and Firm3 respectively.
41